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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The District Court entered the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on January 23, 2009. Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal with the District 
Court on January 29, 2009. This Court therefore has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case presents the following two issues for appeal. 
1. Was the District Court correct in granting the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the basis that the City's actions qualified for governmental immunity under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(18)(b)? 
a. Standard of Review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for 
correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson. 177 
P.3d 600, If 6 (Utah 2008). 
b. Issue Preserved At: Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 476-515], and at the Hearing on Pending 
Motions held January 6, 2009 [R. 654]. 
2. Was the District Court correct in denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder of Parties 
in the face of an amended Scheduling Order? 
a. Standard of Review: The District Court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Joinder of Parties constituted a legal conclusion, and is therefore reviewed 
under a standard of correctness. See Orvis v. Johnson. 177 P.3d 600, f 6. 
b. Issue Preserved At: Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder of Parties [R. 172-175], 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Joinder of Parties [R. 178-
205], Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for 
Joinder of Parties [R. 233-238], Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration [R. 323-
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325 and 330-332], Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Reconsideration [R. 326-329 and 332-334], Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration [R. 339-341]. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are relevant to a determination of the first issue presented, the 
relevant portions of which are reproduced here. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (repealed 2004) 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are 
immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental 
function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other governmental 
health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional 
health care clinical training program conducted in either public or private facilities. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (repealed 2004) 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; 
(e) transporting or removing injured persons to a place where emergency 
medical assistance can be rendered or where the person can be transported by 
a licensed ambulance service; or 
(f) intervening during dam emergencies; or 
The following Rules of Civil Procedure are crucial to a determination of the second 
issue presented by this case. 
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Rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(a) Permissive joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert 
any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of 
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any 
question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action. All persons 
may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, 
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any 
question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or 
defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief 
demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to 
their respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants according to their 
respective liabilities. 
Rule 21 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped 
or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any 
stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a party may be 
severed and proceeded with separately. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim 
is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be 
in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case requires this Court to determine whether a municipality's management of 
the city's water pressure system necessarily falls under the fire fighting exemption from the 
Governmental Immunity Act's general waiver of immunity for negligent acts of a 
governmental entity or its employees. This case also requires this Court to determine 
whether, under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party's motion to join third parties as 
plaintiffs may be denied as untimely following entry of a stipulated amended scheduling 
order expressly extending the deadline for joining parties. 
Course of Proceedings 
On August 5, 2003, the City of Washington increased the water pressure throughout 
the city, causing the water pressure in the Majestic View Subdivision, a subdivision in the 
City, to exceed 160 psi. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, ^f 16, 18 [R. 437]; Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 22, ^ 6 [EL 476]; Affidavit of John Daniel Thorpe, fflf 4-5. The City made this 
increase despite its knowledge that the homes in the Majestic View Subdivision had been 
constructed with pressure reducing valves incapable of handling sustained water pressure in 
excess of 25-80 psi, and without prior notice to the citizens living in the Majestic View 
Subdivision. See Affidavit of John Daniel Thorpe, fflf 7, 10-12 [R. 191]; Affidavit of Eldon 
Dwayne East, fflf 3-4 \K. 195]; Affidavit of Sherene East, ffl[ 3-4 [R. 200]. The unexpected 
increase in water pressure caused high-pressure water leaks and resultant property damage to 
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many of the homes in the Majestic View Subdivision, including the homes of Plaintiffs. See 
Affidavit of Eldon Dwavne East. ffl[ 7, 10 [R. 195]; Affidavit of Sherene East. %5\R. 200]. 
On November 11, 2003, Plaintiffs sent a "Notice of Claim" to the City's Recorder 
concerning the incident and naming as Plaintiffs, "Paul A. Wilkinson, Eldon D. East and 
other residents of the Majestic view Subdivision." [R. 521].The original complaint naming 
Paul and Donna Wilkinson and Eldon and Sherene East as Plaintiffs was filed March 4, 
2004. [R. 1]. 
On April 8, 2006, the home of Steve and Allison Woods, also located in the Majestic 
View Subdivision, succumbed to the continuous extreme water pressure and suffered 
significant damage. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Joinder of Parties [R. 178]; 
See Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Joinder of Parties [R. 233]. See 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration [R. 326]. 
On July 31, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Joinder of Parties under Rule 20 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R. 175]. That motion was fully briefed by November 25, 
2006, and a Request to Submit for Decision on the motion was filed on February 13, 2007. 
[R. 284]. 
On May 9, 2007, counsel for both sides submitted an "Amended Attorneys 
Scheduling Order", in which they agreed that the deadline for Plaintiffs to join additional 
parties was August 31, 2007. [R. 296]. The District Court approved and adopted this 
stipulated and amended scheduling order on May 12, 2007. [R. 294]. 
On August 6, 2007, the District Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder of 
Parties, with a single word of explanation: "Untimely." [R. 321]. 
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On June 17, 2008, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 434]. On 
July 22, 2008, in connection with their opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiffs submitted an Affidavit of John Daniel Thorpe. [R. 517]. On August 25, 
2008, Defendant filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of John Daniel Thorpe. Both of 
Defendant's Motions were fully briefed and a Request to Submit for Decision on the 
Motions was filed on September 30, 2008. [R. 635]. At a hearing on January 6, 2009 Judge 
Shumate of the Fifth Judicial District Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment stating Washington City was immune under the "fire prevention theory." [R. 686]. 
Though Defendant's Motion to Strike was not addressed at the January 6, 2009 
hearing, the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment entered on January 
23, 2009 included an order granting Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of John 
Daniel Thorpe; the District Court gave no reason for striking the Affidavit. [R. 657]. 
On January 29, 2009, Plaintiffs filed an Objection to the form of the Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, specifically objecting to the language included 
in that order striking the Affidavit of John Daniel Thorpe. [R. 661]. No action has been 
taken by the District Court to correct or amend its Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about August 5, 2003, the Appellant City of Washington (the "City") added a 
new water line to the city's water system to compensate for the growing demand 
from new residential building throughout the city. See Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [^1 [R. 306]. 
2. On June 18, 2007, the District Court entered findings of fact that specifically stated 
"In early August 2003, to remedy a lack of water pressure to homes in Washington 
City's higher elevations, the City Increased the water pressure in its new pipeline—the 
Southern Transmission line." Id. 
3. On January 8, 2004, in a separate but related case, Judge Shumate entered a finding of 
fact that prior to August of 2003, in certain areas of the City, there was not enough 
water pressure to even take a shower or turn on a faucet. See Reporter's Transcript of 
Proceedings for Summary Judgment [R. 687], p. 9 1. 21 to p. 101. 15 (referring to 
Cloud v. Washington City Inc (Utah case no. 030501521)). 
4. Plaintiffs have asserted, in their Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, 
and in response to paragraph 8 of the City's Statement of Facts, that the City's 
primary purpose in installing the increasing the water pressure was to improve and 
provide infrastructure. [R. 476]. 
5. Mr. John Daniel Thorpe, a former employee of the City, has filed an Affidavit1 in this 
1
 Based solely upon its legal conclusion that the City's purpose in increasing the City's water 
pressure was for fire-protection reasons rather than the reasons stated by Mr. Thorpe, the 
District Court included in its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
an order granting the City's motion to Strike Mr. Thorpe's Affidavit. Because plaintiffs now 
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case in which he represented that the City decided to increase the water pressure 
primarily in order to increase water pressure to the City's subdivisions. [R. 517]. 
6. Mr. Dwayne Isom, the City's fire chief in August of 2003 and for 23 years prior to 
that, testified in his deposition that he routinely tested the flow capacity of fire 
hydrants throughout City, and that he could not recall any problems with the City's 
fire hydrants' flow capacity that would have led to the City's decision to increase 
water pressure. Deposition of Dwayne Isom p. 9 1. 2 to p. 101. 3; p. 121. 10 to p. 141. 
2. 
7. At oral argument, Plaintiffs also referred the Court to Mr. Isom's prior testimony in a 
sister case also heard before Judge Shumate. In that case, Mr. Isom testified that he 
was required to make periodic reports to the City regarding the sufficiency of water 
flow to the City's fire hydrants. Mr. Isom testified that in not one of his periodic 
reports prior to August of 2003 did he indicate that there was a problem with water 
flow to the fire hydrants. See. See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings for Summary 
Judgment [R. 687], p. 141. 15 to p. 15 1. 13 (referring to Cloud v. Washington City Inc 
(Utah case no. 030501521)). 
8. Despite this evidence and the District Court's prior finding of fact, the City 
maintained, and the District Court reached the legal conclusion on January 23, 2009, 
that the City's actions in increasing the water pressure were protected fire-fighting 
activities. See Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment[R. 657]. 
9. As a direct result of the increased water pressure throughout the City, the water 
appeal the Court's Order, Mr. Thorpe's Affidavit is material and a piece of evidence whose 
admissibility is in dispute, and citation is therefore made to it under Rule 24(e). 
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pressure in the Majestic View Subdivision, where each of the Plaintiffs resided, 
increased to more than 160 pounds per square inch ("psi"). See Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, ^f 16, 18 [R. 437]; 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment p. 22, TJ 6 [R. 476]; 
Affidavit of John Daniel Thorpe. 1J5 [R. 517]. 
10. Plaintiffs' homes were commonly equipped with pressure reducing valves designed to 
handle sustained pressure of no more than 25-80 psi. Id. at [^ 11. 
11. As a direct result of the City's increase of the water pressure, Plaintiffs' homes and 
personal property were significantly damaged. See Affidavit of Eldon Dwayne East. 
1fl[ 7, 10 [R. 195]; Affidavit of Sherene East. 1 5 [R. 200. 
12. The City has so far refused to reduce the water pressure entering the Majestic View 
Subdivision. See Affidavit of Eldon Dwayne East. Tf 21 [R. 195]; Affidavit of Sherene 
East, ^ 10 [R. 200]. 
13. On April 8, 2006, Appellants Steve and Allison Woods' home sustained significant 
damage because of the continuous and extreme water pressure applied by the City. 
See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Joinder of Parties [R. 178]; See Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Joinder of Parties [R. 233]. See 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration \R. 326] 
14. Before increasing the water pressure, and during all relevant periods since the 
increase, the City knew that Plaintiffs' water pressure reducing valves were incapable 
of handling the water pressure that the City was about to impose upon them. See 
Affidavit of John Daniel Thorpe, fflf 10-12 [R. 517]. 
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15. Moreover, Plaintiffs were given no notice of the City's plan to increase the water 
pressure, and no opportunity to take remedial measures to prevent damage to their 
homes and personal property. See Affidavit of Eldon Dwayne East fflf 3-4 [R. 195]; 
Affidavit of Sherene East ffl[ 3-4 [R. 200]. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act generally waives immunity for damages 
caused by a governmental entity's or employee's negligence except in certain specific 
activities, including fire-fighting activities. Neither the plain language of the statute, however, 
nor its interpretation by Utah courts provides a basis to sustain the District Court's legal 
conclusion that the City's actions in increasing the City's water pressure constituted fire-
fighting activities such that the City would retain immunity for any damage caused by the 
new water pressure. Moreover, the District Court's conclusion that the City's actions 
constituted fire-fighting activities conflicts with its own prior and unchanged factual 
findings. At the very least, the City's purpose in increasing the water pressure was a material 
issue of disputed fact. Therefore, the District Court's legal conclusion that the City's 
activities fell under the fire-fighting exclusion and the court's subsequent decision to grant 
summary judgment to the City were incorrect and should be reversed. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorize joinder of any party as a plaintiff who 
asserts a claim joindy or severally with the existing plaintiffs, or who asserts a claim arising 
from the same transaction or occurrence as the claims of the existing plaintiffs, and whose 
claims raise a common question of law or fact. Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder of Parties 
requested simply that Mr. and Mrs. Woods, who asserted claims joindy with the existing 
Plaintiffs and who asserted claims that arose from the same occurrences as the claims of the 
existing Plaintiffs, be allowed to join the action as Plaintiffs. Moreover, under the amended 
scheduling order, as entered by the District Court, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Joinder of 
Parties well in advance of the deadline for joining parties. Furthermore, the fact that the 
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Plaintiffs' November 11, 2003 Notice of Claim notified the City of "other residents of the 
Majestic View Subdivision" who might join in Plaintiffs' claims, justifies Mr. and Mrs. 
Woods' later Motion for Joinder of Parties despite their names not being specifically 
mentioned on the Notice of Claim. Therefore, the District Court's denial of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Joinder of Parties as "untimely" was incorrect and should be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT THE 
CITY'S ACTIONS FELL UNDER THE FIRE-FIGHTING 
EXCLUSION AND WERE THEREFORE PROTECTED BY 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY WAS INCORRECT AND 
SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 expressly waives governmental immunity for the negligent 
actions of governmental entities or government employees with a few, limited exceptions, 
one of which is when "the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from.. .the 
activitfy] of... fighting fire." Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(18)(b). The City has asserted in its 
Motion for Summary Judgment that its sole purpose in increasing the City's water system 
pressure was to ensure that there would be sufficient pressure throughout the City to operate 
the necessary fire hydrants. Based on this assertion, the City has argued that adding the extra 
water line to the system constituted a fire-fighting activity, and therefore that any negligence 
on the City's part or on the part of its employees arising out of, connected with, or resulting 
from that action is immune from Plaintiffs' claims. 
In fact, however, the District Court had issued and not altered a prior factual finding 
that the City's purpose in increasing the water pressure was "to remedy a lack of water 
pressure to homes in Washington City's higher elevations." At the very least, the City's true 
purpose in increasing the City's water pressure is a genuine and disputed issue of material 
fact that is not subject to summary judgment. Additionally, the City's increase of the water 
pressure, even if partially motivated by the need to supply the fire hydrants with sufficient 
water, did not constitute a fire-fighting activity. Finally, the City's other negligent actions, 
including the City's failure to provide Plaintiffs with notice of the planned increase in water 
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pressure or with an opportunity to take appropriate steps to prevent the resulting damage to 
their homes and personal property, are not connected with any fire-fighting activities. 
A. The District Court's Conclusion That The City's Actions Fell 
under the Fire-Fighting Exclusion Is Precluded by a Prior, 
Unchanged Finding of that Court. 
On June 18, 2007, in granting Defendant's prior Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, the District Court made a factual finding that the City's purpose in increasing the 
water pressure throughout the City was "to remedy a lack of water pressure to homes in 
Washington City's higher elevations." On January 8, 2004, the District Court in a sister case 
to the one at bar, issued a finding of fact that prior to August of 2003, there were certain 
areas of the city where there was no enough water pressure to even take a shower or turn on 
a faucet. On January 23, 2009, the District Court, without any reference to its prior findings, 
concluded that the City's purpose and actions in increasing the water pressure throughout 
the city were protected as fire-fighting activities. 
The District Court's present conclusion, in support of its most recent Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, is precluded under the law of the case. At the 
very least, the District Court's contradictory findings show that the City's true purpose in 
increasing the water pressure throughout the City is an issue of real dispute, and that 
summary judgment is therefore inappropriate. 
B. The City's Purpose in Raising the City's Water Pressure is a 
Material, Disputed Issue of Fact, Making Summary Judgment 
Inappropriate. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a Motion for Summary 
Judgment be denied unless "the pleadings, depositions, answxrs to interrogatories, and 
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admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
In the present case, the City's purpose in increasing the water pressure is a genuine and 
disputed issue of material fact. 
Plaintiffs have asserted, in their Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, 
and in response to paragraph 8 of the City's Statement of Facts, that the City's primary 
concern in increasing water pressure was to improve and provide infrastructure. 
Mr. John Daniel Thorpe, a former employee of the City, has filed an Affidavit2 in this 
case in which he represented that the City's decision to increase water pressure was made 
primarily in order to increase water pressure to the City's subdivisions. 
Mr. Dwayne Isom, the City's fire chief in August of 2003 and for 23 years prior to 
that, testified in his deposition that he routinely tested the flow capacity of fire hydrants 
throughout City. Mr. Isom also testified that he could not recall any problems with the City's 
fire hydrants' flow capacity that would have motivated the City's actions in increasing the 
water pressure. Additionally, in a sister case, Mr. Isom testified that, prior to August of 2003, 
he had never indicated to the City that there was any problem with the water flow to the 
City's fire hydrants, despite the requirement that he regularly test that water flow and issue a 
formal report to the City. Accordingly, it cannot be true that the City's plan to increase water 
pressure was primarily motivated by a desire to prevent fires. 
The record clearly shows that the City's true purpose in increasing the water pressure 
is, at the very least, a genuine and disputed issue of material fact. Therefore, the District 
2
 See footnote #1 above. 
21 
Court's entry of summary judgment was incorrect under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and should be reversed. 
C. Installing a New Water Line Is Not a Fire-Fighting Activity. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(18)(b) only preserves governmental immunity for 
"activities of.. .fighting fire." Aside from Plaintiffs' dispute over the City's true purpose in 
installing the new water line, the District Court's grant of summary judgment was incorrect 
because the City's actions were not "activities of.. .fighting fire." 
When interpreting a statute, a Utah court must always look first to the statute's plain 
language in order to discern legislature's intent. See, e.g., In re Kunz. 99 P.3d 793, ^ f 8 (Utah 
2004) ("Pursuant to general principles of statutory interpretation, 'we ... look first to the ... 
plain language,' recognizing that 'our primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent 
in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.'" (quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 
177, 184 (Utah 1998) (alteration in original))); State v. Hunt. 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) 
("The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act is 
the plain language of the Act." (quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, a Utah court must 
assume that each term in the statute was purposefully used, and therefore must read each 
term literally, "unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." County Bd. of 
Equalization of Wasatch County v. State Tax Comm'n. 944 P.2d 370, 373 (Utah 1997) 
fquoting Savage Indus.. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991)). 
Additionally, a Utah court should try to read the plain language of a statute as a 
whole, with due consideration of the other provisions and in an effort to interpret them in 
harmony with each other and "with other statutes under the same and related chapters." 
77 
State v. SchofielcL 63 P.3d 667, ^ f 8 (Utah 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Finally, a Utah court may only move beyond a consideration of the statute's plain 
language if the court is required to resolve some ambiguity in that language. See State v. 
Burns. 4 P.3d 795,125 (Utah 2000). 
In interpreting Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(18)(b), the legislature's intent is clear from 
the plain language of the statute. The statute reads in relevant part as follows: 
"Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from.. .the activities of... fighting fire." 
The City has argued that the statute should be interpreted to include all activities 
related to fire prevention, however, the legislature's intent is clear. The plain language of the 
statute only exempts actions from the statute's general waiver of immunity that are 
associated with "the activities.. .of fighting fire." The exemption is not ambiguous, and the 
scope of activities included does not include fire prevention activities. 
More specifically, installing a new water line to increase the Cities' water pressure 
does not fall within the plain meaning of "fighting fire." The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
defines "fight" as "to contend against in or as if in battle or physical combat." In order to 
qualify for this limited exclusion from the government's waiver of immunity, the City's 
actions in installing the new water line must have constituted a fight against fire "as if in 
batde or physical combat." This was clearly not the case. 
In looking at the scope of activities that the legislature exempted from the waiver of 
immunity as a whole, it becomes clear that the legislative intent behind Utah Code Ann. §63-
30-10(18) was to allow governmental entities and their employees the discretion to respond 
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to physical emergencies without the fear of being liable for decisions that may, in hindsight, 
appear negligent. The list of exempt actions includes: providing emergency medical services, 
handling hazardous waste, emergency evacuations, transporting injured persons for 
emergency medical care, and intervening during dam emergencies. When read in light of 
these other exempt activities, it is clear that the legislature did not intend to include the 
installation of an additional water line under its exemption for "fire fighting" activities. There 
was no urgency or imminent threat that required the City or its employees to make a split-
second decision under high pressure. This was a planned and deliberated improvement of 
the City's infrastructure, not a fire-fighting activity. As such, it does not fall within Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-10(18)'s exemption. 
The only reported case interpreting Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(18)'s exemption for 
fire-fighting activity is Lyon v. Burton. 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000). In Lyon, a fire chief driving 
an emergency vehicle to the scene of a fire negligently collided with another vehicle and 
injured the plaintiffs. Defendants in the case claimed governmental immunity under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(18), arguing that the fire chief was engaged in fire-fighting activities at 
the time of the accident. Id. The Utah Supreme Court held, however, that the defendants 
were not entitled to immunity and that the jury's verdict against them should stand. Id. 
Clearly, if a fire-chiefs driving to the scene of an ongoing fire does not constitute fire-
fighting, then installing a new water line in order to provide water for the City's fire hydrants, 
even if that were the City's sole purpose, does not constitute fire-fighting such that the City 
is entitled to immunity. Therefore, the District Court's decision to grant summary judgment 
was incorrect and should be reversed. 
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D. The City's Other Actions Which Gave Rise to Plaintiffs' Injuries 
Did Not Constitute Fire-Fighting Activities. 
Not only did the City negligently cause the damage to Plaintiffs' homes by installing 
the new water line, the City also caused that damage by negligently failing to provide the 
Plaintiffs with notice of the planned increase in water pressure, by negligently failing to 
provide Plaintiffs with the time necessary to accommodate for the planned increase in water 
pressure, and by negligently failing to decrease the water pressure after being notified of the 
continuing damage being done to the Plaintiffs' homes, personal property, and property 
values. None of the City's additional contributing actions constituted a fire-fighting activity 
that would entitle the City to immunity from Plaintiffs' claims. 
As argued above, to qualify for immunity under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(18)(b), 
the City's actions must have constituted "fire-fighting" under the plain meaning of that term, 
must have been performed in the face of an emergency, and must have been more like fire 
fighting than a fire-chief driving to the scene of an ongoing fire. Failing to provide notice to 
the Plaintiffs of the planned increase in water pressure, failing to provide Plaintiffs the time 
to accommodate for the increased water pressure, and failing to correct the continuing 
damage caused by the increased water pressure are not fire fighting activities. 
In addition to not being immune from Plaintiffs' claims for the damages caused by 
the City's negligent installation of a new water line, the City is not immune from Plaintiffs' 
claims for the City's other negligent and non-fire-fighting activities. Therefore, the District 
Court's summary conclusion that the City is immune from Plaintiffs' claims for these 
negligent acts was incorrect, and should be reversed. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR JOINDER OF PARTIES WAS INCORRECT AND SHOULD 
BE REVERSED. 
A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder of Parties Was Not Untimely. 
Under Rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a]ll persons may join in one 
action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in 
respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the 
action." In addition, "Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of 
any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just." 
Rule 21 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellants Steven and Allison Woods were residents of Majestic View Subdivision on 
August 5, 2003 when the City of Washington arbitrarily increased the water pressure in the 
Majestic View Subdivision far above the limits of residents' pressure reducing valves. Along 
with the other Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Woods' home suffered significant damage from the 
City's decision to increase of the water pressure, and subsequent failure to decrease the 
pressure. 
The Woods sought to join the present action as interested parties with a right to relief 
jointly, severally, or in the alternative arising out of the same conduct by the Defendant 
regarding its setting of water pressure. Moreover, the Woods' claims involve common 
questions of law and fact with the claims of the other Plaintiffs, including whether the City 
was culpable for damage resulting from its high water pressure settings. Plaintiffs filed a 
Motion for Joinder of Parties with the District Court on July 6, 2006. Before ruling on 
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Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder of Parties, the District Court entered an Amended Scheduling 
Order, which extended the deadline to add new parties to August 31, 2007. Then, on August 
6, 2007, more than three weeks before the cutoff deadline to add new parties, and more than 
a year after submission of Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder of Parties, the District Court denied 
Plaintiffs' Motion, stating only that the Motion was untimely. 
Plaintiffs'July 6, 2006 Motion for Joinder of Parties was made prior to the August 31, 
2007 deadline for joining parties, and was therefore clearly not untimely. Accordingly, the 
District Court's ruling on the Motion should be reversed as incorrect. 
Moreover, Appellants Steve and Allison Woods did not become aware of their claims 
against Washington City until April 8, 2006, when their plumbing finally succumbed to the 
extreme and continuous pressure being applied by the City. The July 6, 2006 Motion for 
Joinder of Parties was made well within the statutory limitation period on Mr. and Mrs. 
Woods' claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder of Parties was clearly not untimely, 
and the District Court's denial of that motion should be reversed. 
B. Joinder of Mr. and Mrs. Woods Was Not Prevented by the Notice 
of Claim Requirement. 
The City's argument in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder of Parties is that 
the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Woods' claims under the Governmental 
Immunity Act because Plaintiffs' initial Notice of Claim did not specifically list the Woods as 
parties. This argument must also fail, and the District Court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Joinder of Parties should be reversed as incorrect. 
The purpose of the Notice of Claim "is to provide.. .the governmental entity an 
opportunity to correct the condition that caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps 
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settle the matter without the expense of litigation." Pigs Gun Club. Inc. v. Sanpete County, 
42 P.3d 379,110 (Utah 2002) (quoting Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp.. 955 P.2d 343, 345-
46 (Utah 1998)) (alteration in original). 
In Houghton v. Department of Health, the Utah Supreme Court permitted 
subsequent plaintiffs to participate in an action against a governmental entity despite the fact 
that those subsequent plaintiffs neither filed a notice of claim themselves, nor were 
specifically named as plaintiffs in the notice of claim that was filed. Houghton v. Department 
of Health. 125 P.3d 860, [^19 (Utah 2005). The notice of claim in Houghton alerted the 
governmental entity of the possibility of a class action, but did not specifically name all of 
the potential plaintiffs. Following an objection similar to that raised by the City in the instant 
case, the Utah Supreme Court held in Houghton that the notice of claim satisfied the 
statutory requirements and that subsequent plaintiffs were permitted to participate in the 
litigation. Houghton reiterated an earlier announced principle that a plaintiff need only 
include "enough specificity in the notice [of claim] to inform as to the nature of the claim so 
that the defendant can appraise its potential liability." Id. at ^[21, (citing Yearsley v. Jensen. 
798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990)). The Court concluded "that plaintiffs' notice of claim 
satisfied the requirements of the Immunity Act with respect to both its description of the 
claims and its identification of the plaintiffs." Id. Because the plaintiffs' Notice of Claim 
satisfied the statutory requirements by alerting the governmental entity to the underlying 
facts and potential for litigation, subsequent plaintiffs were allowed to join the litigation. 
In the present case, Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim, though it does not list Mr. and Mrs. 
Woods by name, specifically lists "other residents of the Majestic View subdivision" as 
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possible plaintiffs. The Woods were residents of the Majestic View Subdivision at the time 
that the other Plaintiffs' homes were damaged by the City's actions. The City's actions that 
form the basis of the Plaintiffs' claims in this case, also caused damage to Mr. and Mrs. 
Woods' home. The City was given notice of the damages that had resulted from their 
actions, and they knew that "other residents" of the subdivision could be parties. While the 
Woods were not specifically named in the Notice of Claim, they were named generally, and 
the City was on notice, by virtue of the properly filed Notice of Claim, of the Woods' 
potential claim. Therefore, the District Court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder of 
Parties, insofar as it was based on a failure of the Woods' Notice of Claim, was incorrect and 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the District Court's decision to 
grant the City summary judgment, including striking the Affidavit of John Daniel Thorpe, 
and should reverse the District Court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder of Parties. 
Respectfully submitted this U> day of sJtAM* 2009. 
MICHAEL A. PARKES 
H E I D E M A N , MCKAY, HEUGLY & OLSEN, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
1. Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (January 23, 2009). 
2. Court's Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Joiner of Parties (August 6, 2007). 
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Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (January 23, 2009) 
Bryan J. Pattison (8766) 
JeffreyN.Starkey(5415) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
192 East 200 North, Third Floor 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 674-0400 
Facsimile: (435) 628-1610 
Attorneys for Washington City 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL A. WILKINSON, DONNA 
WILKINSON, ELDON D. EAST, and 
SHERENE EAST, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
WASHINGTON CITY, and 10 unknown 
persons working for or under the authority of 
Washington City, Inc., and JOHN DOES I-
XII, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 040500378 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant Washington City's motions for 
summary judgment on Plaintiffs' remaining claims. The Court held a hearing on the motions on 
January 6,2009. Having reviewed and considered the parties' memoranda and argument at the, 
the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that might preclude 
entry of summary judgment. The Court further concludes that Defendant Washington City is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, it is undisputed that the City's reason for 
FILED 
/WUW23 &H 10'-J 
WiSHWGTOM COUNTY 
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increasing the water pressure in the Majestic View subdivision was for the purpose of providing 
sufficient fire flow at fire hydrants for fire protection purposes. This action constitutes a fire 
fighting activity and therefore the City is immune from suit under section 63-30-10(18)(b) of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Further, the Court grants the City's motion to strike the 
affidavit of John Daniel Thorpe because the affidavit is insufficient under Rule 56(e) standards 
and otherwise contradicts Mr. Thorpe's prior sworn deposition testimony. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and dismisses Plaintiffs' claims. 
DATED THIS 2-3 day of xjfc^ 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge ^ ^ 
Court's Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Joiner of Parties 
(August 6, 2007) 
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